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Systems for Catastrophic Safety 
 
K.C. King 
 
Destination and Path of a Modern Systems Approach to Catastrophic Hazard Risk Mitigation 
 
Introduction:  For every participant the Katrina experience was a nightmare.  It was not only a 
nightmare in physical safety but in social survival.  The Katrina nightmare visited individual 
victims as well as virtually all the institutional players.  The scale and devastation redefined what 
it meant to experience a catastrophe.  Not only did Katrina visit while the storm was raging, but 
its effects continued and continue for more than half a decade.   
 
The other chapters of this report look at opportunities for improving individual programmatic 
parts of the federal government’s approach to catastrophe preparation, response and recovery.  
They also offer responsible recommendations for changes without in most cases altering the 
existing framework for disaster management.  This chapter seeks to investigate deeply rooted 
issues and causes that would suggest solutions requiring more comprehensive changes and 
disruptions. 
Readers need to be prepared to see a significantly more radical yet comprehensive path to 
dealing with the broader issues uncovered by the catastrophic Katrina experience.  Compared to 
the recommendations in other chapters, this alternative would entail a transformative paradigm 
shift.  Each issue discussed herein corresponds to patterns that have been observed in other 
fields, and each recommendation is based on proven, world class practices.  In many respects this 
approach applies to both structural and non-structural mitigation and conjectures that a single 
integrated system to address prevention, response and recovery is indicated by the consistent 
patterns of dysfunctionality and poor performance we found in the current, non-integrated 
approach.  The author argues that the appropriate integrating focus should be on serving the 
individual resident and his or her community to make them safe from future catastrophes and to 
respond and recover so that people and communities survive and prosper. 
Over the course of our investigation we began to note some patterns appearing across programs, 
agencies and jurisdictions.  Other critiques of the Katrina experience pointed to similar issues 
and suggested solutions.  In reviewing successful disaster management experiences around the 
world we encountered efforts that had come to adopt some of these radical changes.  This 
chapter reiterates the data that was available and associates it with our own experience and 
interviews.  The name we give our analysis and recommended radical approach is:  a 
comprehensive systems approach (see Figure 1).   
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Figure 1: Ingredients of a Successful Systems Approach 
Supporting this overall systems view we include some focus areas that are meaningful and 
consistent with any systems approach and that were not much in evidence in the collective 
institutional services that constituted Katrina’s disaster management actors. These supporting 
elements are:  safety first, performance excellence and stakeholder focus, and a systems 
(engineering) approach itself.  
1.  Flood Protection, Response and Recovery Were Not Systems 
Nobody knew that the flood defenses would be so easily overwhelmed and be so brittle. No one 
anticipated weeks of being under water.  No one thought of or planned for extended 
displacement or the struggle of masses of residents trying to repair or rebuild in a region that had 
already been built out.   
The clearest assessment that there was, in fact, a “systems problem” was provided by the Corps 
of Engineers who’s Interagency Performance Evaluation Team (IPET) June 23, 2009 Final 
Report found: 
1. “The system did not perform as a system” 
2. “The lack of resilience … significantly increased flooding and resultant losses” 
3. “Planning and design methods need to be system-based” 
4. Hurricane protection structures need to be designed as a part of a complete system-based 
approach …” 
5. “Designs need to be conservative …” 
6. “Resilience needs to be factored in to all designs to prevent catastrophic failure …” 
7. “The system in place before Katrina was compromised by a long series of decisions 
driven by competing priorities, incremental decision making and funding, inadequate 
consideration of change and de-facto standards far too low to deal with the realities of 
modern natural hazards 
8. “Designs need to better consider unknowns”  
9. “New Orleans remains vulnerable to large storms” 
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Recommendation #1a :  Adopt resilience systems engineering practices to create flood 
management as a true system which is appropriately organized, empowered, and integrated all-
hazard safety team.  
 
Figure 2: Multiple Lines of Defense System Framework  
(Source: Lake Pontchartrain Basin Foundation) 
 
Discussion: While people believe they work rationally and systematically and may even use the 
word system in describing their efforts, the systems approach this chapter is referring to is one 
which embraces the internationally standardized best practices of systems engineers to produce 
solutions that deliver results of value to their intended stakeholders across all related disciplines 
(civil engineering, individual assistance, public assistance, mitigation, etc.) and resources.   
While those disciplines contribute and are still focused on everything from physical structures to 
environmental restoration to responding to incidents to recovering safely, their collective effort 
does not yield an integrated, coordinated, non-duplicative and responsive system unless it has 
been forged by systems engineers to pull out desirable and safety-essential emergent properties 
such as integration and system-wide resiliency.   
What would such a catastrophe management system look like?  The best way to look at a system 
is to look through the eyes of professionals who commonly define large problems and solutions 
in both holistic and analytic terms (systems architects).  In a holistic view from the top, you 
would see the key elements of the systems, the stakeholders who are impacted by its results and 
the interactions or interfaces between components and stakeholders.  You would expect to  
 
Figure 3: Context for Catastrophes 
(Source: Jackson, Scott: Architecting Resilient Systems, Wiley 2010) 
 
see a view that represented “flat water” and another that depicted say, storm surge or the 
disturbed condition in order to establish the range of resilience needed.  You would want to see 
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an organizational picture of how all resource providers had formed an integrated, empowered 
and resourced team to ensure elements and element providers were working together.  You 
would expect to see a simple statement of their shared vision that ensures they are all working 
towards the understanding of the same goal.  An example of such a vision could be as simple as 
“safety first” which is at the core of the Dutch flood defenses.  A very important view of the 
system would be all the key risks that have to be overcome or mitigated for the end system 
products to perform up to expectations.  Water’s ability to seek out weaknesses regardless of 
political or administrative boundaries is a law of physics that cannot be nullified by legislation or 
Federalism. 
 
Proceeding concurrently, systems engineers would be considering the disruptions and stresses 
under which the system must deliver or recover delivering protection.   System risk analysts 
would quantify and allocate risk and risk response to components with those risks that can’t be 
allocated to elements of the solution system identified and clearly and actionably communicated 
as residual risks to stakeholders. 
 
The end system “product” would consist of physical and social structures, processes, information 
all ready to address disruptions with adequate notice.  The operational system would be under 
constant review and assessment to continuously improve its performance and responsiveness 
while tightly controlling costs.  In the case of a catastrophe management system, elements of the 
system would be continuously working with stakeholder decision makers to promote safety 
through better decision making at the regional, community and individual level.  In preparation 
for an incident, key stakeholders should decide on actions to relocate and avoid risks or to install 
mitigation measures to reduce impact.  These are the same decision-makers who must decide to 
evacuate as well as decide to return and rebuild safer.  If measures, such as realistic flood 
elevations or probabilities expressed in meaningful terms (life of a mortgage) are not visible, 
understood and accessible to decision makers, catastrophe will sooner or later result.  Those 
stakeholders, such as home owners, businesses, renters, infrastructure managers, etc. are shaped 
and enabled by their culture and the ways in which that culture communicates and reinforces 
messages about risks.  This is not new. 
 
Systems Engineering Mechanisms 
 
Systems engineers employ a broad array of practices all aimed at insuring performance, integrity 
and resilience.  Some of the most critical omissions in the “systems in name only” that 
characterized all elements of the Katrina experience include: 
 
Requirements: 
The central practice of requirements engineering is to elicit requirements from 
stakeholders where those stakeholders and their expected results of value (e.g. protection 
from flood damage) become the ultimate measure of the system’s success.  One of the 
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key elements of requirements engineering is to frame and model requirements as results 
of value to stakeholders.  Requirements are then traced to the evolving design and 
implementation throughout its life cycle to facilitate the impact of change.   
The requirements engineering process is the root of forming a shared vision among all 
stakeholders.  This vision was not shared prior to Katrina.  It was pointedly unshared 
during the delayed response of Federal troops.  It was evidently unshared between state 
recovery authorities when the Housing and Urban Development (HUD) Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG) focus wrenchingly switched from recovery to victim 
compensation years after the event.  The lack of a shared vision has led to a program that 
promises up to $100,000 FEMA grants to mitigate hazards that results in only a few 
hundred of the approximately 35,000 residents expressing interest.  To avoid this from 
happening again, clashes between stakeholder results of value need to be sought out and, 
when found, resolved to a negotiated win-win condition.  Capacity to select among 
alternative solutions depends on this being accomplished. 
This inability of our federal system of government to form shared visions and agreed 
upon goals between the central government, state governments, municipal governments, 
economic growth interests and individuals when it comes to personal, institutional and 
property safety is a major stumbling block.  We have actually been able to do just this in 
aviation and rail safety.  We seem to accept a central air transportation solution.  We 
don’t seem to be able to do this effectively for mine safety or flood safety.  The Dutch 
seem to have achieved a continuously informed and shared vision about putting safety 
first in its water policy.  Progress, in the form of the National Disaster Recovery 
Framework, seems to include flood safety as a peer goal among a long list of non-safety 
goals.  Failure to put safety in a politics free zone under the care of competent and ethical 
engineers will ensure that losses will continue to mount and lives will continue to be lost. 
Architecting: 
Architecture and architecting are unique and distinctive traits of systems.  Systems have 
architecture which is reflected in holistic and analytic “views” of the entire system from a 
number of essential perspectives including operational, supportability, developmental and 
resiliency.  Architecting not only relies on the traditional reductionist tools and rules of 
systems analysis but employs holistic or “up” rules to ensure there is a whole and that it 
delivers emergent properties not attributable to any one component such as integrity and 
resilience.   
Systems architects not only designate the key components and their supporting 
disciplines but define and control how these parts interact with each other and with the 
supporting actors, culture and infrastructure.  Interface Control Working Groups are 
designated to establish and maintain formal, agreed upon specifications for each interface 
which is controlled throughout the life cycle.  As has been observed by the US Army 
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Corps of Engineers (USACE) Interagency Performance (IPET) and experienced in the 
fragmented recovery efforts, interfaces became the weak points where structures failed 
and programs were unsynchronized to the total frustration of victims.  This was 
particularly evident in elevation programs where failures to recover safely (several 
hundred awards out of 35,000 expressions of interest were, to a large extent, due to 
conflicting rules and schedules among non-cooperating elevation programs rather than 
intentional defrauding by homeowners who took elevation funds but have not yet 
elevated.) 
2.  Safety Is Not a Shared Goal for Life-Critical National Flood Protection Programs 
 
As indicated in Figure 1, safety first is the shared vision that a safety system needs to be based 
on.  Safety first and a systems approach are the twin pillars of the Netherlands’ successful 
national water policy.  One of the primary motivators for adopting a systems approach is in fact 
complex systems where human safety is critical to success and avoids potentially catastrophic 
surprises.  As we have seen in New Orleans and Haiti, safety was not an important consideration 
while in the Netherlands and Chile-- with its strict and systematically applied earthquake proof 
building codes-- have been able to withstand tight stress conditions.  It is inconceivable that 
future catastrophes can be avoided without a national consensus that safety should come first and 
be articulated in an overarching nation policy. 
 
Recommendation #2a: Create a national hazard safety policy that places safety first. 
 
Discussion:  As seen in the behavior of Louisiana residents, leadership, government officials and 
commercial interests, there is an ongoing conflict among convenience, growth and hazard safety 
with long term safety often taking a back seat.  When specific decisions are made regarding 
adopting conservative safety measures (i.e., base flood elevations), leadership is consistent in 
erring on the side of inappropriate optimism.  Land development interests appear to be gaining 
the upper hand in ensuring new and revitalized levees that maximize the amount of land 
available rather than emphasizing more resilient security for established, more defensible, 
communities.  
The fact that recovery in devastated New Orleans is primarily at grade with few elevations above 
the Katrina high water mark is more evidence that safety was not put first but put behind social 
and economic recovery.  With the proportion of safe to unsafe houses being as low as it is, one 
could assess that New Orleans lost an opportunity to come back safely and survive inevitable 
future storms and engineering failures.  Many returning residents voice their perception as 
follows:  “If it happens again, the government will buy me out and I’m out of here.”  For a 
community whose culture is defined in terms of multigenerational interactions, this might very 
well have a detrimental effect. 
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3.  Unacceptable Performance under Catastrophic Stress  
 
Process performance by most Katrina-related public sector activities failed to deliver results of 
value to stakeholder residents. 
 
Recommendation #3a:  Direct that institutions engaged in hazard safety achieve performance 
excellence against established and objective criteria. 
 
Discussion:  The third element of a comprehensive systems approach is the evident need to cope 
with the stress of a catastrophe and the catastrophic scale of recovery efforts by achieving the 
highest levels and continuously improving them for all processes performed.  The Louisiana 
Road Home Program established once and for all the idiocy of expecting ad hoc policies and 
processes to accommodate hundreds of thousands of displaced persons and destroyed homes, 
infrastructures and businesses.  In the height of activity in December 2006 applicants to the Road 
Home Program were told by staff that the Program was in “chaos.”  Error rates and rework were 
extremely high.  The actual extent of administrative rework was unknown because there were no 
published metrics for the quality of application processing.  When members of the LRA Housing 
Task Force suggested that the LRA consider adopting proven quality management practices, the 
staff admitted they were too busy. 
 
Another sign of performance deficiency was the instability of the processes.  As of March 28, 
2009, rules governing payment of Individual Mitigation Measures had not been stabilized and 
were in direct conflict with what the original 2006 LRA plan had committed to recovering 
residents. 
 
In the last half of the 20
th
 century, Americans were discovering that the Japanese were using 
continuous processes improvement to build better, cheaper automobiles that people wanted.  
Even more humiliating was that the Japanese were being taught by Americans such as W. 
Edwards Deming, and Joseph Juran.  The concepts adopted by the Japanese are now the norm at 
virtually all world class manufacturing and service organizations.   
 
The key areas of continuous processes improvement employed by the Malcolm Baldrige 
National Quality Award criteria include: 
 
1. Leadership 
2. Strategic Planning 
3. Customer Focus 
4. Measurement, Analysis, and Knowledge Management 
5. Workforce Focus 
6. Process Management 
7. Results 
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The Software Engineering Institute at Carnegie Mellon has devised a framework or model to 
specifically address systems engineering capabilities – what processes are needed to engineer a 
system and maturity levels of an organization’s ability to use those processes which range across 
the following five levels: 
 
 
Figure 4: Five Levels of “Maturity” in CMMI  
(Source: Software Engineering Institute, 2008) 
 
The bottom line is that these practices address the following predictable faults, all experienced 
during the Katrina by virtually all agencies 
 
Missed Commitments 
 Spiraling costs 
 Late delivery to the market 
 Last-minute crunches 
 
Inadequate Management Visibility 
 Too many surprises 
 
Quality Problems 
 Customer complaints 
 Too much rework 
 Functions not working correctly 
 
Poor Morale 
 Burned-out people 
 Inadequate control of project results 
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Institutionalizing continuous process improvement and avoiding the above conditions is best 
done in a methodical and iterative series of improvement cycles.  Starting from scratch it 
typically takes more than 2 years to reach level 3 and another 2 years to reach level 5.  This 
implies that it is unlikely that you will create a high performance organization after a catastrophe 
is experienced.  Building the capability and exhibiting the maturity able to stand up to 
catastrophe must be in place before a catastrophe strikes.  
 
4.   No Focus on Key Stakeholders  
 
All dimensions of Katrina hazard avoidance, survival and recovery shared a broad lack of focus 
on key stakeholders--those who are significantly impact by the results of a solution.  These 
include not only officials and solution developers (contractors) but residents who expect to be 
protected and, when protection fails, assisted in surviving and recovering. 
 
Recommendation #4a:  Adopt international standard resilience systems engineering practices to 
ensure that stakeholders are identified and their legitimate expectations (protection, survival and 
recovery) delivered by all hazard safety institutions. 
 
Discussion:  Global advances in productivity have resulted in a large part from the innovations 
introduced by the total quality community such as the imperative of understanding that quality is 
measured by how stakeholders perceive the results they get.  .  In the case of flood protection, 
response and recovery, key stakeholders are those who suffer (or might suffer) extensive 
damage.  Stakeholders also include taxpayers, as well as those who deliver any form of service, 
directly or indirectly to victims.   These practices are strongly embedded in the Malcolm 
Baldridge National Quality Awards and pervade modern systems engineering as well as best 
commercial and government administrative activities.  From Katrina forward, failure to adopt 
this simple concept is a guarantee of program failure. 
 
The essential element of a comprehensive systems approach is engaging and communicating 
with stakeholders.  This is truly the lynch pin of a successful systems approach.  When you adopt 
the view that success is defined by the value you deliver to customers and clients you are on the 
road to discovering why systems engineering, performance excellence and safety first are 
imperative elements. 
 
Stakeholder communications is also one of the pervasive complaints of and faults in everything 
to do with preparation response and recovery with respect to Katrina. 
 
Before Katrina there was almost total complacency on the part of residents and their leadership 
with respect to risks from storms.  This complacency was encouraged by optimistic and 
unrealistic assertions by Corps spokespersons regarding the increasing risks faced by residents. 
Achieving Successful Long-Term Recovery and Safety from a Catastrophe 
 
 
10 
 
In 2002 the Times Picayune reported that “The Army Corps of Engineers says the chance of 
New Orleans-area levees being topped is remote.”  That gap continues to this day where 
communications about recovering flood protection structures (levees and flood walls) is driven 
by National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements for public comment on 
environmental issues, not a commitment of the Corps to communicate safety.  In its CAT5 study, 
the Corps-led Louisiana Coastal Protection and Restoration  (LACPR) planning effort only 
acknowledges congressional investment interest and took no note of resident stakeholders’ 
safety. 
 
Complacency should also be used to characterize the attitude of not adopting building codes and 
base flood elevations that reflected the true risks.  Despite adopting international building codes 
statewide after Katrina, at-risk houses are not required to install Dade County rated shutters.  
One can conjecture that this is the message being sent by FEMA when they deny individual 
mitigation measures (IMM) to new recovery construction. 
 
During and well after the response phase, citizens used the web discussion groups to keep each 
other informed and warned of misleading or inconsistent information provided by authorities.  
Some maintain that without these neighborhood- based discussion groups many residents would 
not have returned; but also many made what, in retrospect, was the right decision not to return 
based on what they learned on these web sites. 
 
Recovery program communications with all classes of stakeholders can only be characterized as 
reluctant at best and non-existent as the norm.  It took citizen activists to pry out the rules for 
compensation grants and organizations like UNO-CHART to try to represent the process of 
acquiring elevation funds, the effort of determining eligibility and steps to apply.  And such 
efforts were pro bono citizen activities or supported by private foundation funding rather than 
state resources.  Statistical reports from the Road Home program dealt with work flow volumes 
and did not address the growing applicant waiting time (aging) and quality until activists pointed 
out this deficiency.  Programs subsequent to the CDBG compensation had even less visibility, 
relevance and completeness.  Press releases only announce good news and never seemed to 
communicate delays or uncertainties.  This is not a framework where victims can rationally plan 
their recovery let alone attempt to do so safely.  
 
In general, what few stakeholder communications events that were held appeared to be 
unfocused and not in line with best systems and process practices of identifying roles and results 
of value and reporting on achievement of those results throughout the recovery and concurrent 
preparation. 
 
It should be noted that all of the “doctrine” cited for systems engineering, continuous process 
improvement and shared visions have the same stakeholder focus and provide methods to ensure 
that stakeholders’ voices are heeded and acted on.  It may be politically hard but should not be an 
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administratively complicated effort to insure that stakeholder results of value are integrated into 
legislative direction and guidance. 
 
5.  No One Was and Is In Charge   
 
There is no experience of success in any safety critical arena when these conditions are not 
achieved. Catastrophes are serious stuff.  They can permanently disable regions, impact the 
national economy and devastate people and their sanity far beyond the immediate relief efforts.  
One might go so far as to say that the primary constitutional function of the government is to 
protect our citizens from all enemies – including the blunders of our officials when linked with 
the uncertain nature of powerful natural disaster events. 
 
We have also learned that preparing for, responding to and recovering from a catastrophe is no 
place for ill-prepared amateurs and ad hoc solutions.  Only world class solutions and highly 
capable and mature institutions can act effectively and humanely under catastrophic stresses. 
 
Recommendation #5a:   Employ skilled, empowered, integrated product teams (IPT) under the 
direction of proven and committed leadership to deliver works and services that provide results 
valued by stakeholders. 
 
We fully recognize that the family of complementary and consistent solution elements will be a 
“hard row to hoe.”  Resistance to changes in values and practices is itself a major challenge.  To 
that we can say that the systems approach, coupled with proven team-based leadership and 
execution, has been successful and is being followed with predicted results by world class 
organizations.   It has also been adopted in less mature institutions than the professional 
bureaucracy that must do it for storm safety.  Although there are alternative paths to fixing 
specific problems, in the end a comprehensive systems approach is the only way to proactively 
avoid similar problems in future, inevitable catastrophes. 
 
